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TROPHY HOMES AND OTHER ALPINE PREDATORS: 
THE PROTECTION OF MOUNTAIN VIEWS THROUGH 
RIDGE LINE ZONING 
The greatest good 
For the greatest number 
For the longest time. 
Lisa Healy* 
-Gifford Pinchot on forest conservation 
INTRODUCTION 
The year is 2010. In 1995, you purchased a home in a rural town in 
the Rocky Mountains, hoping to get away from the traffic, pollution, 
crowds, and stress of life in a city. 
Welcome to the future. The population of your mountain town has 
increased from 8,000 to 30,000.1 Fifteen years ago, you looked out your 
windows at dusk to see dark purple mountain ridges outlined by the 
sunset. Today, you see the tops of ski condos, restaurants, and radio 
towers. The pristine views and clean air you came here to enjoy have 
been replaced by subdivisions, strip malls, enormous vacation homes, 
and automobile pollution that ferments in the mountain valleys. 
This vision of the future is one that those who run to the mountains 
to escape city life, those who already live in mountain towns, and 
those who just love visiting the mountains, must look at and consider 
today. Real estate developers in mountain towns from Vail, Colorado 
to Stowe, Vermont are providing city escapees with the rural homes 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
1 JIM HOWE, ED McMAHON & LUTHER PROPST, BALANCING NATURE AND COMMERCE IN 
GATEWAY COMMUNITIES 3 (1997) [hereinafter HOWE]. "If current demographic trends continue, 
[mountain] communities will experience astronomical growth rates for at least the next 20 
years." [d. 
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they want-often enormous, and usually with beautiful views.2 Devel-
opers are making a killing on cheap land prices,s and in the process 
are killing the very things that the city escapees come to the moun-
tains for: open space, beautiful views, and a pristine environment.4 
What can mountain towns do to preserve their character and 
beauty, and to prevent the type of rapid, unplanned growth that can 
create the scenic and social ills many city dwellers are desperate to 
escape? This Comment examines ridge line zoning, one of many land 
use planning options that can be utilized by local governments to 
preserve scenic beauty in mountainous areas. Ridge line zoning is 
municipal land use regulation that restricts development on the ridge 
lines of mountains so that their scenic value will not be compromised.6 
North Carolina was the first state in the country to pass mountain 
ridge zoning legislation, and the value of ridge preservation should 
convince other mountainous states, cities, and towns to follow suit.6 
While the aesthetic and environmental reasons for preserving the 
scenic beauty of a rural mountain town may be enough to convince 
most towns that it is essential to preserve mountain views, there are 
also strong and convincing economic arguments for scenic preserva-
tion.7 For example, the U.S. Travel Data Center estimates that des-
ignating a road as a "scenic byway" generates annual tourist revenues 
of between $30,000 and $35,000 per designated mile.s Americans 
spend $18 billion a year to watch wildlife, triple what they spend on 
movies or sporting events.9 
Aside from tourist revenues, it is much more expensive for a town 
to support developed land.lo For every dollar of tax revenue collected 
from residential land uses, local governments spend an average of 
$1.36 to provide services to those residences,u In Huntsville, Ala-
2 See Rebecca Harwood, Rural Monster Homes May Not Fly, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 
24, 1995 (available in http://www.hcn.orgll995/jul24ldirlWestern_Rural_mons.html>). 
8 See HoWE, supra note 1, at 3. In 1981, the average cost of an acre of land in Bozeman, 
Montana was $600; in 1994, that same acre was worth $10,000. [d. 
4 See id. 
5 See Robert M. Kessler, North Carolina's Ridge Law: No V'IeW From the Top, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 197,205 (1984) [hereinafter Kessler]. 
6 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-206 to -214 (1997). 
7 See, e.g., HoWE, supra note 1, at 9-22. 
8 See id. at 27. 
9 See id. at 30 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE 1991 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, 
HUNTING AND WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION (1991». 
10 See id. at 87. 
11 [d. 
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barna, city officials determined that allowing a developer to build 
high-priced homes on the western slope of Monte Sano Mountain (the 
town's most visible landmark) would cost the city about $5 million to 
install roads and other service infrastructure, and another $1.4 million 
a year to service the development.12 Instead of paying for the costly 
support of the new homes, the city chose to acquire the entire parcel 
for $3 million, and preserve it as a dedicated park.13 
In Santa Fe, New Mexico, where the local legislature passed an 
ordinance restricting the number of buildings on hilltops and allowing 
the city planning board to specify where homes can be built to mini-
mize their intrusion on the landscape, mountain property can cost $1 
million-just for the land.14 "Part of the reason property values are so 
high is that we've preserved something," explains one city council 
member. "If we build on all the ridgetops, people won't come out 
here."16 One landowner in Santa Fe has brought suit against the town, 
challenging that the ordinance is unconstitutional.I6 
This Comment will examine the legal aspects of ridge line zoning. 
Section I will examine the municipal authority to zone. Section II will 
discuss the legal history of zoning for purely aesthetic purposes. 
Section III is an assessment of the most likely legal challenge to ridge 
line zoning: private property takings claims under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Section IV will look at recent regulations protecting ridge lines 
through zoning, and Section V provides examples of innovative ways 
in which municipalities can protect the ridge line vistas in their com-
munities. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ZONE-THE GENERAL 
WELFARE 
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court determined that local 
governments had a constitutional right to control private land use 
through zoning regulations.17 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 
the Court determined that through the police power inherent in the 
Tenth Amendment, local government had the authority to zone to 
12 HOWE, supra note 1, at 87. 
13Id. 
14 Andrea Gerlin, Hilltop in Santa Fe Becomes Battleground, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1997 (page 
unavailable). 
16Id. 
16Id. 
17 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
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provide for public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. IS Govern-
ment's authority to determine permissible uses of private property is 
based on the inherent police power of the states,19 and this authority 
may be delegated to local governments through state enabling legis-
lation.20 
The Court in Euclid also stated that judicial review of zoning or-
dinances should be governed by an arbitrary and unreasonable stand-
ard: "before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must 
be shown that] such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare."21 This portion of Justice Sutherland's decision is 
indicative of the era of liberal judicial attitudes toward municipal land 
use regulation sparked by the Euclid decision.22 Because courts gen-
erally accepted that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to 
governmentallegislation,23 after Euclid, a landowner wishing to chal-
lenge a zoning ordinance faced the added burden of proving that the 
zoning legislation was not substantially related to the health, safety, 
or general welfare interest it was intended to further.24 
II. ZONING FOR AESTHETIC PURPOSES 
Justice Sutherland's landmark decision in Euclid provided the legal 
blueprint for aesthetic zoning.25 Aesthetic zoning is land use regula-
tion by a municipality that strives to preserve the beauty, architec-
tural integrity, or visual identity of an area.26 While health and safety 
concerns may be addressed by an aesthetic zoning ordinance, most 
often this type of zoning relies on the general welfare for its justifica-
tion.27 
18 See id. at 395. 
19 See 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.01 (4th ed. 1980). 
20 See Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General 
Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REV. 603 (1981). 
21 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
22 See Michael Pace, Aesthetic Regulation: A New General Rule, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 581, 583 
(1987). 
23 See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1923); see also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. "If the 
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative 
judgment must be allowed to control." [d. 
24 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. 
25 See id. at 379-97. 
26 See Jesse Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 218, 223 (1955) (stating that if the regulated land use would not be offensive to a blind 
person, the primary objective of the regulation is aesthetic). 
'l:T See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). 
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Traditional judicial decisions have questioned state regulation to 
better the general welfare,28 finding that the term "general welfare" 
is too broad and has the potential to provide the state with too much 
control over private land use.29 However, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed this concern in Euclid.30 The Court implied that the 
legislature is elected by the public, and hence its decisions are reflec-
tions of what the public believes is in its best interest.31 Therefore, 
legislative regulations will be given a judicial presumption of validity 
as furthering the general welfare.32 The Court in Euclid agreed that 
the general welfare was broad, but it stated that this breadth served 
an important purpose-as the world changed, the public's notion of 
what was in its best interest would also change.33 The Euclid Court 
recognized that government is reliant on the elasticity of the General 
Welfare Clause to allow it to tailor regulations to the changing needs 
and desires of its constituency: "Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, 
and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so appar-
ent that they are now uniformly sustained . . . half a century ago, 
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive."34 
The Court recognized that changing times and attitudes, new tech-
nology, and economic and social conditions would affect public senti-
ment, government authority, and judicial interpretation.35 
The last forty years have brought about a dramatic change in public 
attitudes regarding our natural environment.36 This increased public 
awareness of environmental problems and a desire to "get back to 
nature" have been reflected in the prevailing legislative and judicial 
sentiment that aesthetic regulation to preserve natural beauty, wild-
life, and open space is permissible in the name ofthe general welfare.37 
28 See, e.g., Bachman v. State, 359 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Ark. 1962) (holding that automobile 
junkyard cannot be prohibited solely on the basis of aesthetics but must include health or safety 
rationale); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.w. 929 (Mo. 1911) 
(ordinance banning billboards upheld because of regulatory language including public safety 
instead of pure aesthetics). 
29 Rowlett, supra note 10, at 604. 
30 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. at 387. 
33 See id. 
34 [d. 
35 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387 (using automobiles as an example of a technological innovation 
giving rise to regulations that would not have been previously necessary or acceptable under 
the police power). 
36 See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3d rev. ed. 1982). 
37 See infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text. 
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This is exactly the type of collective social change that Justice 
Sutherland argued would naturally broaden the police power.3S A 
dramatic decrease in open space coupled with an increase in technol-
ogy, pollution, and public interest in environmental issues combined 
to shift accepted legislative policy regarding land use, and conse-
quently, courts have changed their angle when reviewing environ-
mental legislation. As Justice Sutherland predicted, what would have 
been unheard of at the beginning of this century (clean air and water 
legislation, for example) is now commonly accepted as public neces-
sity.39 The Supreme Court of New York stated that in reviewing 
aesthetic regulations, "circumstance, surrounding conditions, changed 
social attitudes, newly-acquired knowledge ... alter our view of what 
is reasonable .... "40 The overwhelming majority of modern courts 
have upheld zoning that protects health, safety, and the general wel-
fare through aesthetic regulations.41 
38 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. 
39 See id. 
40 Cromwell v. Ferrier, 225 N.E.2d 749, 752 (N.Y. 1967). 
41 At least thirty-one states have gone a step further and adopted the majority rule that 
aesthetics can stand alone as the purpose for a land use regulation. See, e.g., Metromedia v. City 
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (upholding city ordinance banning off-site commercial bill-
boards based on aesthetic concerns); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); City of Scottsdale v. 
Arizona Sign Assoc. Inc., 564 P.2d 922 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that there is no disagreement with 
respect to the power of communities to exercise the police power with regard to aesthetics); 
Landmark Land Co. v. City and County of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986) (holding that 
protection of view of Rocky Mountains from Denver could stand alone as purpose of building 
height restriction); Builders, Inc. v. Sartin, 207 A.2d 12 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964); City of Sunrise 
v. DCA Homes, Inc., 421 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); H & H Operations, Inc. v. City 
of Peachtree, 283 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 1981); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825 (Haw. 1967); 
La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 312 N.E.2d 625 (Ill. 1975); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 
375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 339 N.E.2d 
709 (Mass. 1975) (court held that aesthetics could stand alone in Massachusetts as justification 
of use of police power: "We live in a changing world where the law must respond to the demands 
of a modem society ... what was deemed unreasonable in the past may now be reasonable due 
to changing community values"); National Used Cars, Inc., v. City of Kalamazoo, 233 N.W.2d 64 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Roberts Enters., Inc., 304 So. 2d 
637 (Miss. 1974); State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1977); Apler v. State Dept. of Highways, 
603 P.2d 1085 (Nev. 1979); Asselin v. Thwn of Conway, 628 A.2d 247 (N.H. 1993); Westfield Motor 
Sales Co. v. Westfield, 324 A.2d 113 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); Temple Baptist Church 
Inc., v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M. 1982); People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1963); State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982); City of Lebanon v. McClure, 533 
N.E.2d 783 (Ohio 1988); State ex. rei. Dep't of Transp. v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1979); Oregon 
City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 (Or. 1965); State v. Slnith, 618 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1981); Buhler v. 
Stone, 533 P.2d 292 (Utah 1975); Kamrwoski v. State, 142 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. 1966). 
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Historically, courts were reluctant to uphold land use regulation 
enacted to protect purely aesthetic interests.42 Prior to the 1950s, 
courts often viewed aesthetics as a luxury rather than a necessity,43 
or considered aesthetic values to be too subjective, repeatedly stating 
that they refused to become "arbiters of taste" because "one man's 
pleasure may be another's perturbation, and vice versa."44 Courts 
worried that the vagueness of aesthetic ideals could work a denial of 
due process, as landowners would be unable to determine whether 
their use was nonconforming under aesthetic zoning regulations.45 
Slowly but consistently, courts have begun to change their opinions 
of aesthetic objectives in the area of municipal zoning.46 The majority 
position is now that aesthetic purposes may stand alone as justifica-
tion for a zoning ordinance.47 
In moving toward this position, courts first stopped at a middle 
ground-aesthetic regulation would be upheld as long as it also served 
one of the more traditional police power objectives of protecting 
public health or safety.48 For example, regulations prohibiting junk-
yards in residential areas were often upheld on the grounds that they 
served sanitation and public health objectives,49 and ordinances pro-
42 See, e.g., Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842 (Ohio 1925) (holding that mere 
aesthetic considerations cannot justify the use of the police power). 
43 See Nancy J. Creswell, Enhancing the Vermont 7bwnscape: Design Review, 7 VT. L. REV. 
363, 383 (1982). "The regulation of private property for aesthetic reasons, while it may have 
served to 'secure a triumph of pleasure and perhaps beauty ... was not a matter of necessity 
affecting the health or safety or welfare of the common weal.''' (quoting J. MORRISON, HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION LAW 21 (1965». 
44 See Youngstown, 148 N.E. at 844 ("The public view as to what is necessary for aesthetic 
progress greatly varies. Certain legislatures might consider that it was more important to 
cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beethoven, for posters than for Rembrandt, and for limericks 
than for Keats."); see also John Donnelly & Sons, 339 N.E.2d at 716 (aesthetic judgments "are 
a matter of individual taste and are thus too subjective to be applied in any but an arbitrary 
and capricious manner"); Raymond Robert Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethink-
ing Traditional Judicial Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 141, 147 (1987); see generally James Charles 
Smith, Law, Beauty, and Human Stability: A Rose Is a Rose Is a Rose, 78 CAL. L. REV. 787 
(1990). 
46 See Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 697, 725-26 (1995). 
46 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
47 See id. 
48 See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Greene, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (N.Y. 1932) ("Beauty can shelter herself under 
the wing of safety, morality or decency."). 
49 See, e.g., Bachman v. State, 359 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Ark. 1962) (holding that automobile 
junkyard cannot be prohibited solely on the basis of aesthetics but must include health or safety 
rationale). 
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hibiting billboards were allowed if they cloaked their true intention 
of preserving scenic vistas under statements that their purpose was 
to protect drivers from accident-inducing distractions, or to eliminate 
hiding places for criminals.5O 
Aesthetic zoning regulations no longer have to weave health and 
safety language into their stated purpose. In 1954, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a municipal plan to beautify an area of Wash-
ington, D.C. in the case of Berman v. Parker.51 Berman did for aes-
thetic zoning what Euclid had done for comprehensive zoning nearly 
thirty years before: it gave the Supreme Court's stamp of constitu-
tional approval to municipalities' authority to zone for purely aes-
thetic reasons.52 The controversy in Berman arose out of the District 
of Columbia's attempt to revitalize a dilapidated portion of the city 
that was both a health and safety concern to city officials and citizens, 
and an aesthetic blight.53 In efforts to eliminate and prevent substan-
dard housing, the city condemned and re-zoned commercial property 
through a comprehensive development plan,54 and the owners of prop-
erty affected by the plan brought suit challenging the land use regu-
lation.55 In deciding the controversy, the Court held that it was within 
the power of the legislative branch to take aesthetic considerations 
into account when enacting land use regulation.56 A by-product of the 
decision was the precedent that aesthetic purposes alone can satisfy 
the general welfare requirement of the police power.57 Writing for a 
unanimous court, Justice Douglas penned the words used by myriad 
courts in upholding purely aesthetic land use regulation: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
50 See, e.g., St. Louis Gunning Advert. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929 (Mo. 1911) (The 
city's purported reasons for adopting the ordinance prohibiting billboards were protection of 
pedestrians from injury in case of high winds, prevention of fire hazards and elimination of 
hiding places for criminals.). 
51 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
52 See id. at 33; see also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. 
53 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 30. 
54 See id. at 28-29. 
65 See id. at 31. 
66 See id. at 32-33. 
67 See Pace, supra note 22, at 581. "Although Berman was primarily concerned with eminent 
domain as it related to slum clearance, the language of the Court strongly endorsed aesthetics 
as a basis for government action." [d. at 584. 
1998] RIDGE LINE ZONING 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled.58 
921 
The Court went on to state that legislation is a reflection of the 
public interest, and that the legislature, being the main guardian of 
the public, is better suited than the judiciary to decide how to protect 
citizens and their surroundings through use of the police power.69 
The Court in Berman stated that when a local legislature passes a 
regulation furthering aesthetic values, the regulation will be pre-
sumed to further the public welfare.60 After Berman, simply passing 
a regulation gives it a presumption of validity under the police power, 
as the legislature is assumed to be acting to protect the public welfare, 
which, according to the Supreme Court, is a very broad term.61 So, 
although the term "general welfare" is broad, Berman stated that it 
is up to the legislature to define what is in the best interest of the 
public.62 Legislation is a reflection of what the public wants as codified 
by the pens of its elected officials, and that legislation is therefore 
presumed to further the general welfare.63 If the legislature passes a 
land use regulation the sole purpose of which is to further aesthetic 
values, after Berman the presumption is that the general welfare is 
enhanced by the regulation.64 The Berman decision broadened the 
definition of the general welfare, holding that aesthetic goals could 
stand alone as the purpose of a zoning regulation.65 
Berman set off a landslide of state court decisions upholding the 
validity of regulations that relied on aesthetics as their only purpose 
in furthering the general welfare.66 The Court of Appeals of New York 
was quick to adopt Berman's position that aesthetics could stand 
alone as the sole reason for a zoning regulation.67 In People v. Stover, 
a homeowner hung a clothesline in his front yard to protest taxation, 
and added a line once a year for five years.58 In response to complaints 
from neighbors and other town residents, the local legislature enacted 
an ordinance prohibiting the placement of clotheslines in front or side 
68 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 
69 See id. at 32. 
60 See id. at 33. 
6l See id. (concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive). 
62 [d. 
63 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
64 See id. 
66 See id. at 33. 
66 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
67 See People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1963). 
68 See id. at 273. 
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yards.69 In responding to the suit brought by the tax protester to 
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, the New York Court 
of Appeals quoted Berman, and stated that aesthetics could stand 
alone as a legitimate goal, justifying exercise of the police power.70 The 
Stover decision broke new ground in state law, and has been cited in 
most jurisdictions that have adopted the "aesthetics alone" position.71 
State after state followed the Berman and Stover precedent, adding 
strength and precedents to what is now the majority position: regu-
lations that seek to protect or enhance the visual beauty of a commu-
nity further the general welfare, and are to be given equal status with 
the more traditional police power objectives of furthering public 
health and safety.72 A majority of states now accept that aesthetic 
considerations may stand alone as the sole purpose behind zoning 
ordinances.73 
A. Aesthetic Zoning For Scenic View Protection-Prelude 7b 
Ridge Line Zoning 
In the years since the Berman decision, Americans have experi-
enced a widespread increase in income and leisure time, leading to an 
ability to indulge preferences for a more attractive environment.74 
Legislatures across the country have reflected this public interest in 
aesthetics through the passage of land use and construction regula-
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 275. 
71 See Pace, supra note 22, at 585. 
72 See, e.g., Belmar Estates v. California Coastal Comm'n, 115 Cal. App. 3d 936 (1981) (uphold-
ing zoning board's denial of construction permit based on statute prohibiting obstruction of 
Santa Monica mountain views); Dawson Enter. v. Blaine County, 567 P.2d 1257 (Idaho 1977) 
(Idaho supreme court upheld zoning provision which had as its purpose maintaining the rural 
character of the county); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 199 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1972) ("a community's aesthetic well being can contribute to urban man's psychological and 
emotional stability" and "a visually satisfying city can stimulate identity and pride-foundation 
of social responsibility and citizenship"); Wes Outdoor Advert. Co. v. Goldberg, 262 A.2d 199 
(N.J. 1970) (New Jersey court recognized that there is universal acceptance of what is beautiful 
in a given setting); State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982) (upholding regulation of junk yards 
for purely aesthetic reasons); Franchise Developers v. City of Cincinnati, 505 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio 
1987) (holding that overlay zoning regulation creating environmental quality district, which had 
as its central purpose the furtherance of aesthetics, was valid and constitutional under the police 
power); Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., Inc., 571 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1977) (court 
upheld view protection ordinance, holding that proposed construction would damage lake views 
in violation of ordinance). 
73 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,387 (1926). 
74 See Norman Williams, Scenic Protection as a Legitimate Goal of Public Regulation, 38 J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 4 (1990). 
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tions aimed at preserving and enhancing the visuallandscape.76 These 
zoning ordinances generally fall into two main categories: zoning to 
prohibit certain uses (such as residential property being used to store 
junk),76 and zoning to preserve the scenic integrity of an area (Den-
ver's ordinance regulating building height to preserve existing views 
of the Rocky Mountains)77. The second type of zoning ordinance is 
becoming more and more common, especially in areas where residents 
choose to purchase real estate based on the natural beauty of the 
surrounding landscape, and in towns where the economy is largely 
dependent on tourists who visit to enjoy beautiful views,78 
In states that have assessed the validity of zoning ordinances 
passed to protect or enhance scenic vistas, courts have unanimously 
agreed that preservation of scenic beauty furthers the general wel-
fare and is therefore within the legitimate scope of the police power.79 
In Asselin v. Town o/Conway, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
addressed a restaurant owner's constitutional challenge to a town 
ordinance prohibiting internally lit signs.80 The court stated that in 
the past, it had held that towns could consider aesthetic values along 
with other factors when passing zoning regulations.81 In Asselin, the 
court upheld the ordinance prohibiting internally lit commercial signs, 
holding that aesthetic considerations could stand as the only purpose 
of a zoning ordinance.82 The court based its holding on its opinion that 
the preservation or enhancement of the visual environment promotes 
the general welfare.83 The facts examined by the court evidenced that 
the intent of the ordinance was to prevent the diminution of views, 
not necessarily to prohibit the signs simply because the town found 
them as a class to be unattractive.84 
76 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-20-104(1) (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-206 to 
-214; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301--4493; Ross v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, 192 Cal. 
App. 3d 370, 375 n.2 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
76 See, e.g., Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, 589 A.2d 1205 (Vt. 1990); State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 
675 (N.C. 1982). 
77 See, e.g., Landmark v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986). 
78 See, e.g., Asselin v. Town of Conway, 628 A.2d 247 (N.H. 1993). 
79 See, e.g., Ross, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 376; Belmar Estates v. California Coastal Comm'n, 115 
Cal. App. 3d 936 (1981); Landmark Land Co., Inc. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986); 
City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); LaSalle Nat'l 
Bank v. City of Evanston, 312 N.E.2d 625 (Ill. 1974); County of Pine v. State Dep't of Nat'l 
Resources, 280 N.W.2d 625 (1979); Asselin, 628 A.2d at 251. 
80 See Asselin, 628 A.2d at 251. 
81 See id. at 250. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 250-51. 
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It is reasonable to infer that the scenic vistas sought to be pre-
served by the town include the splendor of mountains at twilight 
and the brilliance of stars at night .... The evidence supports a 
finding that the restriction on internally lighted signs is rationally 
related to the town's legitimate, aesthetic goals of preserving 
vistas, discouraging development that competes with the natural 
environment, and promoting the character of a "country commu-
nity."86 
The Asselin decision supports the position that preservation of 
scenic mountain vistas is a legitimate aesthetic goal, and that aes-
thetic goals further the general welfare and are therefore a legitimate 
exercise of the police power.86 
In reaching its conclusion in Asselin, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court first assessed whether the ordinance was impermissibly vague 
such that it worked a violation of due process.87 The standard of 
review for this inquiry is whether a person of ordinary intelligence 
would have a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited 
based on the language of the ordinance.86 The court stated that in this 
case the language of the ordinance made its meaning plain: all signs 
lit from within are prohibited in the town of Conway.89 
The court then confirmed that the state zoning enabling act gave 
the town of Conway the authority to zone for purely aesthetic pur-
poses.90 The court stated that the enabling act conferred the broad 
authority to zone for the promotion of the general welfare of the 
community, and that the general welfare would be promoted through 
the preservation and enhancement of the visual environment.91 There-
fore, the town of Conway had the authority to pass aesthetic zoning 
regulations.92 
Having established that the state had conveyed to the town its 
police power, the court next addressed the issue of whether the sign 
ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the police power.93 The court 
stated that because the sign ordinance applied to all sign users and 
manufacturers in the town, the standard of review was whether the 
85 Asselin, 628 A.2d at 250-51. 
88 See id. 
87 See id. at 249. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See Asselin, 628 A.2d at 249-50. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. at 250. 
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ordinance was rationally related to the legitimate goal of the town.94 
The court implied that if the ordinance had applied only to a select 
few, the court would have used a heightened level of scrutiny in 
evaluating the ordinance to ensure that it did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.95 
Finally, the court stated that there is a presumption in New Hamp-
shire that zoning ordinances are valid,96 and after assessing the evi-
dence relied upon by the trial court in its decision to uphold the 
prohibition on internal sign illumination, the court affirmed.97 The 
court stated that the testimony given by an expert witness regarding 
the scenic interference caused by internally lit signs was sufficient to 
support the trial court's decision to uphold the ordinance.98 
The steps taken by the court in Asselin are typical of courts re-
viewing the validity of aesthetic ordinances.99 
B. Regulations to Protect Mountain Views 
Several states have decided cases regarding the validity of moun-
tain view protection statutes.100 The courts' decisions in these cases 
have recognized that mountain views are a unique resource, and that 
state and town governments have the right to protect those resources 
in order to further the general welfare of their citizens.101 
One of the strongest affirmations of the public's interest in zoning 
to protect mountain views came from the California Court of Appeals 
in its decision in Ross v. City of Rolling Hills Estates.102 In Ross, the 
plaintiffs submitted to the city planning board plans for putting an 
addition on their home.103 The city denied the application based on the 
fact that the plan would violate a zoning ordinance prohibiting block-
94 See id. 
95 See Asselin, 628 A.2d at 250. 
96 See id. at 249-50 (quoting Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 489 A.2d 600, 603 (N.H. 1985». 
97 See id. at 250. 
98 See id. "[Ilnternally illuminated signs appear as 'disconnected squares of light' at dusk and 
at night, and that the 'overall effect' of 'an internally-lit sign is to create a visual block that is 
seen at some great distance sort of bobbing at the windshield', while external lights 'soften the 
impact' of signs in the darkness." Id. 
99 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Board of County Comm'rs of Pitkin County, 872 P.2d 1269 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1993); Ross v. Rolling Hills Estates, 192 Cal. App. 3d 370 (1987). 
100 See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz. 1986); Confederacion de la Raza 
Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F.Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Ross, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 376; 
Belmar Estates v. California Coastal Comm'n, 115 Cal. App. 3d 936 (1981); Landmark Land Co., 
Inc. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 1986). 
101 See, e.g., Landmark Land, 728 P.2d at 1286; Ross, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 374. 
1trl See Ross, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 370. 
103 See id. at 373. 
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age of specific existing views.104 The court upheld the ordinance and 
affirmed the denial, stating in its decision that the need to protect the 
scenic character of the area was a stated goal of the view protection 
ordinance,l06 and that the denial of the building permit was reasonably 
related to this legitimate goal of the city.l06 The Ross court accepted 
hillside view protection as the primary purpose of the ordinance.107 
The Ross decision provides legal support to communities looking to 
protect mountain areas and to preserve mountain views through zon-
ing ordinances. lOS The court did not discuss other legislative purposes 
stated in the town's view protection ordinance, implying that the 
interests of the city in preserving the rural character and scenic 
beauty of the hillsides were enough to warrant its utilization of the 
police power to regulate land use.loo 
In Landmark Land v. Denver, the Supreme Court of Colorado went 
a step further than the Ross court, upholding the city of Denver's 
enforcement of a view protection ordinance in an area that was al-
ready highly developed.110 The view protection ordinance at issue in 
Landmark restricted the height of buildings in an office park in order 
to preserve Denver's view of the Rocky Mountains.111 
Unlike the Ross court, the court in Landmark did not rely on the 
legislature's interest in keeping the character of the area rural, but 
rather allowed the city to give value to Denver's view of the Rocky 
Mountains.l12 The court stated that Denver's "civic identity is associ-
ated with its connection with the mountains,"113 and that therefore the 
104 See id. 
106 See id. 
The hillsides of the City constitute a limited natural resource in their scenic value to 
all residents and visitors to the City and their potential for vista points and view lots. 
It is found that public health, safety and welfare require prevention of needless 
destruction and impainnent of views .... 'Ib protect the visual quality of highly scenic 
areas and maintain the rural character of the City, new development should not 
degrade highly scenic natural, historical or open areas and shall be visually subordinate 
to the scenic quality of these areas. 
[d. at 374 & n.2. 
106 See ROSB, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 376. 
10'7 See id. 
108 See id. (treating the view protection ordinance as a zoning ordinance, stating that the two 
are closely related). 
109 See id. at 374-76. 
110 See Landmark Land Co., Inc. v. City of Denver, 728 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Colo. 1986). 
111 See id. at 1283-84. 
112 See id. at 1285. 
113 [d. 
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city's use of the police power to protect that connection was directly 
related to the general welfare of Denver's citizens.u4 
Once it established that the view protection regulation was a legiti-
mate function for the city, the court assessed whether the ordinance 
itself was directly related to that goal.ll5 The court held that a direct 
relationship existed, stating that the specific height restrictions and 
gradations set out in the ordinance were narrowly tailored to serve 
the sole purpose of preserving Denver's view of the Rockies.u6 The 
court went on to say that once the issues of whether view protection 
is a legitimate legislative function, and whether the regulation itself 
is related to that goal, are settled, the city is free to implement the 
regulation in any constitutional method it chooses.u7 
III. POSSIBLE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO AESTHETIC ZONING 
REGULATIONS 
In reviewing challenges to an aesthetic zoning ordinance, a court 
may take any or all of the following steps.U8 First, the court may look 
at the scope of the zoning authority involved.u9 Assuming that the 
jurisdiction follows the majority rule that states can zone for purely 
aesthetic reasons, the court will ask whether the state enabling leg-
islation gives the municipality the authority to zone for aesthetic 
purposes.120 Second, the court might look at whether the regulation is 
a reasonable exercise of the police power.121 The two-part test for this 
inquiry is whether there is a legitimate state interest at stake, and if 
so, whether the regulation itself actually works to further that inter-
est.l22 In making this inquiry, courts are especially careful to examine 
whether the regulation is disguised to serve a forbidden purpose-for 
example, exclusionary zoning cloaked in aesthetic restrictions.l23 Fi-
nally, the court may ask whether the regulation is impermissibly 
114 See id. 
115 See Landmark Land, 728 P.2d at 1285-86. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 1286 (to be considered constitutional the method must not be arbitrary or 
capricious). 
liB See, e.g., Landmark Land, 728 P.2d at 1283; Asselin v. Town of Conway, 628 A.2d 247 (N.H. 
1993); Ross v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, 192 Cal. App. 3d 370 (1987). 
119 See, e.g., Landmark, 728 P.2d at 1285--86. 
120 See, e.g., Asselin, 628 A.2d at 249. 
121 See id. at 250. 
122 See, e.g., Landmark, 728 P.2d at 1285--87; Asselin, 628 A.2d at 250. 
123 See, e.g., Asselin, 628 A.2d at 250 (stating that the court applies heightened scrutiny to 
equal protection challenges). 
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vague such that it could work a violation of due process.124 The stand-
ard for this inquiry is whether a person of ordinary intelligence could 
understand what is prohibited by the regulation; if not, enforcement 
of the regulation is violative of due process because the violator would 
have been without valid notice.l26 
If the regulation can withstand each of these levels of scrutiny, the 
court will find the regulation constitutional.126 However, the land-
owner challenging the aesthetic regulation may still argue that the 
regulation as applied to him or her is unconstitutional.127 For example, 
the landowner may claim that a regulatory taking has occurred be-
cause the ordinance is prohibitive to the point of leaving the land 
valueless.128 
B. Takings 
Although the United States Supreme Court and a majority of state 
courts have held that local governments may regulate land use to 
further purely aesthetic goals,129 municipalities have not necessarily 
cleared all legal hurdles once they have enacted the legislation.lso If 
the zoning regulation is such that it prohibits or restricts a certain 
use of land, the landowner may claim that the use restrictions deprive 
her of the value of her land, and she may sue the municipality for 
compensation. This "takings" claim arises out of the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee that private property will not be taken for public 
use without just compensation.lSl The rationale for providing compen-
sation in cases where government regulation has literally or effec-
tively taken an individual's property is that a few citizens should not 
be forced to bear an unfairly disproportionate burden in advancing a 
public benefit.l32 The Fifth Amendment reflects Americans' conflicting 
124 See id. at 249. 
125 See id. 
126 See, e.g., Landmark, 728 P.2d at 1286. 
127 See Kessler, supra note 5, at 205. 
128 See infra notes 131-88 and accompanying text. 
129 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
130 See DAVID L. CALLIES, TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY 
TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 3 (1996) [hereinafter CALLIES]. 
131 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
132 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The "Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be bome by the public as a whole." Id. at 49. See also 
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 463 (1978). 
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notions of private property rights, recognizing both the sanctity of 
private property, and the fact that under certain circumstances, the 
government/public interest will be greater than the private property 
right,133 The difficult legal issue is how to decide when one interest 
takes precedence over the other, and courts continue to struggle with 
this question.134 
The United States Supreme Court initiated the modern regulatory 
takings dialogue in 1922, when it decided the case of Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon. 135 The government regulation at issue in Pennsylva-
nia Coal was a statute prohibiting coal mining if mining activities 
would cause subsidence of residential land. la6 Prior to Pennsylvania 
Coal, the Court had only recognized actual physical invasions or ap-
propriations of property as takings.137 The Court held that the regu-
lation at issue in Pennsylvania Coal effected a taking because it 
unreasonably restricted one owner's interest in land in order to bene-
fit the interest of another.l38 After Pennsylvania Coal, a regulation 
can effect a taking without actual appropriation, but simply by re-
stricting land use to the point where the owner has essentially given 
up the property for public benefit.139 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Holmes penned the much quoted rule that "while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking."14o 
Since the Pennsylvania Coal decision, courts have struggled with 
the question of how to decide if a regulation goes "too far."14l While 
no court has enunciated a bright line test, the assessment of a takings 
claim requires that the state's interest in regulating the land use be 
balanced with the severity of the deprivation to the property owner.l42 
The Court in Pennsylvania Coal stated that the nature of the state's 
133 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). "Government could hardly go on 
if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every 
such change in the general law." [d. 
134 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
135 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412. 
136 See id. at 412-13. 
137 See CALLIES, supra note 130, at 6. 
138 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. 
139 See id. at 414-15. 
140 [d. 
141 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 
470 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
142 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1050-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[A takings finding] depended 
on whether the government interest was sufficient to prohibit the activity, given the significant 
private cost." [d. 
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interest in the regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a 
taking has occurred, and thus whether compensation is required.l43 
For example, in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court decided that although 
the state had an interest in saving a resident's home from subsidence, 
the deprivation to the owners of the mining rights that would be af-
fected by the regulation was too severe.l44 In other words, the sever-
ity of the costs to the individual landowners outweighed the public 
benefits that the regulation provided.l45 The Pennsylvania Coal 
Court implied that there was a line at which the regulation would be 
considered to infringe too severely on private property interests, but 
it stopped short of addressing the question of exactly when a regula-
tion had gone too far.146 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Court tried to answer the "too far" 
question, deciding the cases of Penn Central Transportation v. New 
York City and Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis.147 Penn 
Central established the validity of regulatory restrictions on property 
as long as the land owners were left with a "reasonably beneficial" or 
economically viable use of their land.148 After Penn Central, courts 
must weigh the facts of each individual case to determine whether 
any reasonably beneficial use of land exists after the regulation is 
enforced .149 
At issue in Penn Central was whether a taking had occurred where 
the owner of Grand Central Terminal was denied a building permit 
pursuant to a New York City law prohibiting alteration of historic 
landmarks without approval.150 The owners of Grand Central Termi-
nal, designated an historic landmark under the New York City Land-
mark Preservation Law, applied for and subsequently were denied a 
permit to construct an office building above the terminal.151 Based on 
this denial, the owners brought suit against the city, claiming that 
application of the Landmark Preservation Law had effected a regu-
latory taking of their property.l52 
148 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. 
144 See id. at 413. 
145 See id. at 413-15. 
146 See id. at 415. 
147 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn Cent. 
Transp., 438 U.S. at 124. 
148 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. 
149 See id. at 124. 
150 See id. at 107. 
151 See id. at 115-16. 
. 152 See id. at 119. 
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The Court set up a case-by-case, ad hoc inquiry standard for takings 
decisions, stating that whether a taking has occurred "depends 
largely upon the particular circumstances [in that] case."163 The Penn 
Central decision also enunciated three factors that courts should as-
sess when reviewing a takings claim: 1) the character of the govern-
ment action; for example, a taking is more likely to be found if a 
physical invasion has occurred; 2) the economic impact of the govern-
ment action on the claimant; and 3) the action's interference with the 
distinct investment-backed expectations of the claimant.l64 The Court 
proceeded to highlight the importance of assessing the government 
interest involved in the regulation, and stated that if the general 
health, safety, and welfare would be promoted by the regulation's 
prohibition of certain uses of land, the regulation would be upheld.l66 
After its enunciation of these required inquiries, the Penn Central 
Court found that no taking had occurred in this case: the restrictions 
imposed by the Landmark Preservation Law were substantially re-
lated to the promotion of the general welfare, and the owners were 
left with a reasonably beneficial use of their land.l66 
Almost a decade after its Penn Central decision, the Court revis-
ited the takings issue in Keystone Bituminous Coal.167 Factually simi-
lar to Pennsylvania Coal, the takings claim in Keystone Bituminous 
Coal involved a challenge to the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act, which 
required that fifty percent of the coal beneath certain structures be 
left intact to prevent destructive subsidence.168 Companies and or-
ganizations with interests in coal mining brought suit, claiming that 
the regulation deprived them of the beneficial and profitable use of 
support estates (their rights to the coal directly beneath the surface 
of the land).169 In assessing the takings claim presented in Keystone 
Bituminous Coal, the Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal, and 
then used its reasoning to find that the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act 
had not effected a taking of property.l60 The Court's analysis was 
based on two basic factors: 1) whether the land use regulation in 
question substantially advanced a legitimate state interest; and 2) 
168 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
1M See id. at 124. 
156 See id. at 125. 
166 See id. at 138. 
167 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
168 See id. at 474-76. 
169 See id. at 479. 
160 See id. at 485. 
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whether the regulation denied the landowner all economically viable 
use of the property.161 The Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal found 
that based on these takings test requirements, no taking had oc-
curred.162 First, the regulation was a result of the Pennsylvania legis-
lature "act[ing] to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat 
to the common welfare."l63 Second, in assessing whether the owner 
retained any economically viable use for the land, the Court compared 
the value of what had been taken from the property with the value 
that remained.l64 The Court stated that for takings law purposes, the 
owners could not divide their interests in the land to assert that all 
economically viable use had been taken from one interest within the 
estate.1SS Looking at their estate as a whole, the Court found that 
economically valuable uses remained, and denied the takings claim.166 
Keystone Bituminous Coal is an exception to recent Supreme 
Court takings decisions, in which the Court has begun to weight the 
takings scale in favor of the individuallandowner.167 Several decisions 
written during Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure echo Reagan-era 
sentiments favoring private interests over government regulation. l66 
In 1992, the Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, and effected a major shift in takings jurisprudence.169 In Lucas, 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, deciding that a coastal protec-
tion statute denied a beach-front land owner all economically bene-
ficial use of his lots, and consequently resulted in a taking.170 The 
majority held that the loss of all economically beneficial use of real 
property constitutes a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment, 
unless the principles of the regulating state's existing property and 
nuisance law give rise to the restrictions on the land's use.l7l The 
161 See id. at 485 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980». 
162 See Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 485. 
163 Id. 
164 See id. at 497. 
165 See id. at 498. 
166 See id. 
167 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
168 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. 
169 See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; see also Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impene-
trable Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental 
Law, 50 WASH. U.T. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996). 
170 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031--32. See also Erin L. Daley, Land-Use Regulations that Deny 
Landowners All Economic Value Can Effectuate a Thking, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 157, 162 
(1993) (stating that the Lucas decision marked the first time the Supreme Court had found that 
a land use regulation rendered real property without economic value). 
171 See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
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Court stated that a taking categorically occurs when there is 1) a 
permanent physical invasion of property, or 2) a regulation denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land.l72 
A few examples of the many changes in takings analysis mandated 
by the Lucas decision make clear why the decision is considered 
revolutionary. First, before Lucas, the Court consistently held that a 
regulatory challenge was not ripe for judicial review until a final 
decision had been made regarding the permissible uses of the prop-
erty.l73 However, the Lucas Court allowed review before the exhaus-
tion of available administrative remedies, stating that the landowner 
was not precluded from bringing suit to demand compensation for 
past deprivations, even though, under a 1990 amendment to the regu-
lation that he was fighting, he could have applied for a variance and 
had failed to do SO.174 Consequently, Justice Scalia implied that a 
landowner no longer has to exhaust all administrative remedies prior 
to bringing a constitutional takings claim.176 
Secondly, the Lucas Court held that a landowner was owed com-
pensation when there was a total deprivation of beneficial use, and 
defined ''beneficial'' to mean economically profitable.176 Justice Scalia 
summed up his opinion of how land should be valued by quoting, "'[f]or 
what is the land but the profits thereor?"'I77 He expanded on this by 
stating that regulations that require "land to be left substantially in 
its natural state" leave the owner without economically beneficial or 
productive options, and therefore often result in a taking.178 
Most revolutionary, however, was Justice Scalia's inference that a 
partial regulatory taking (where only a portion of a piece of property 
is regulated) could be found to be compensable if the "regulation 
has interfered with [the owner's] distinct investment-backed expec-
tations."179 Consequently, after Lucas, it is possible that a court could 
172 [d. at 1015. 
173 See id. at 1041 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
[d. 
This [ripeness] rule is required by the very nature of the inquiry required by the Just 
Compensation Clause, because the factors applied in deciding a takings claim simply 
cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive 
position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in 
question. 
174 See id. at 1011. 
176 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011. 
176 [d. at 1017, 1019. 
177 [d. at 1017. 
176 [d. at 1018. 
179 See id. at 1019 n.7. 
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find that a municipal action that merely diminishes, rather than ex-
tinguishes, the economic value of property constitutes a compensable 
taking.180 
This is especially relevant to ridge line zoning. Depending on how 
the zoning ordinance is formulated, construction may not be allowed 
above a certain elevation, precluding a developer, who owns a parcel 
that runs both above and below the ridge line, from building on part, 
but not all, of the land. After Lucas, it is possible that if investments 
had been made in anticipation of building above the ridge line, this 
landowner could successfully argue that a regulatory taking had oc-
curred, even though the regulation affects only a portion of the parcel 
of land.18l 
Third, The Court stated that a taking would exist where the regu-
lation denies a landowner of all economically valuable land use, unless 
the regulation prohibits a use already forbidden under the state's 
property or nuisance law.l82 "A law or decree [that prohibits all eco-
nomically beneficial use of land] must ... do no more than duplicate 
the result that could have been achieved in the courts ... under the 
State's law of private nuisance .... "l&'! The Court used the example 
of a lake-bed owner, who would have no takings claim if a regulation 
was passed prohibiting landfilling, since that use of the land would 
have flooded adjacent property, and would therefore already have 
been prohibited by state nuisance law.l84 The Court stated that the 
government can avoid its duty to pay just compensation to the land-
owner only if the "proscribed use interests were not part of his title 
to begin with."l85 
This portion of the Lucas decision severely restricts state legisla-
tive power by forcing the state to pay compensation when it passes 
legislation that imposes greater restriction on land use than that 
already imposed by existing state nuisance law.186 In his concurrence, 
Justice Kennedy astutely observed that there could be pressing en-
vironmental dangers that would justify new regulation beyond the 
180 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.7. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 1029. 
183 [d. 
184 See id. 
185 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
186 See id. at 1029-30. "When ... a regulation that declares 'off-limits' all economically produc-
tive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would 
dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it." [d. at 1030. 
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state's common law, and that the Court should not inhibit states from 
enacting regulatory initiatives in response to changing environmental 
conditions.I87 
However, after Lucas, the question remains: when is a landowner 
left with no viable economic use of his or her land? The way that 
courts choose to answer this question has serious repercussions for 
ridge line zoning. If, for example, a court adopts and expands upon 
Justice Scalia's inference that the taking be measured considering 
only the value of the portion affected (as opposed to the whole piece 
of property), municipalities would be reluctant to prohibit construc-
tion above a certain elevation.I88 The municipality could minimize the 
risk of losing a takings suit by abandoning absolute prohibitions, and 
adopting building height or size restrictions instead.I89 
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF RECENT REGULATORY SCHEMES TO 
PROTECT RIDGE LINES THROUGH ZONING: NORTH CAROLINA'S 
MOUNTAIN RIDGE PROTECTION ACT 
In 1983, North Carolina passed the nation's first comprehensive 
statute regulating construction on mountain ridges.I90 The Mountain 
Ridge Protection Act (Ridge Act) was born when an out-of-state 
developer began construction of a ten-story condominium complex at 
the top of Little Sugar Mountain, one of the tallest peaks in the Avery 
County region of North Carolina.I9I Public opposition to the project 
prompted the North Carolina General Assembly to draft and pass 
legislation that mandated local government action regarding moun-
tain ridge protection.I92 The Ridge Act created a regulatory frame-
work for controlling the height of construction anywhere within 100 
feet of the crest of a mountain ridge.I93 
18'1 See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that unique problems like constantly 
changing patterns of coastal erosion warrant flexible regulatory power). 
188 See id. at 1019 n.7. 
189 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-206 to -214. 
190 See id. 
191 See Kessler, supra note 5, at 205. 
192 See Milton S. Heath, Jr., The NOTth Carolina Mountain Ridge Protection Act, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 183, 184 (1984) [hereinafter Heath]. 
1911 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-206 ("Ridge" means the elongated crest or series of crests at 
the apex or uppermost point of intersection between two opposite slopes or sides of a mountain, 
and includes all land within 100 feet below the elevation of any portion of such line or surface 
along the crest. "Crest" means the uppermost line of a mountain or chain of mountains from 
which the land falls away on at least two sides to a lower elevation or elevations). 
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The Ridge Act serves as interesting sample legislation in that it 
gives local governments great flexibility in how they put the law into 
effect in their community.l94 Under the Ridge Act, mountain counties 
could select from three options under the Act: a total prohibition on 
construction, a more flexible local permit system, or a referendum to 
allow voters to decide to opt out of the Act.l95 Within these options, 
the counties were also given a number of more detailed choices, such 
as whether to measure a mountain from sea level or from the valley 
floor.1OO 
Through the Ridge Act, the state of North Carolina gave local gov-
ernments flexible options regarding enaction and implementation.l97 
First, a county or city could choose between a total prohibition on 
construction, or a more flexible local permit system to provide local 
control over ridge construction.l98 Under the Ridge Act, if a county or 
city did not adopt a permit system one year from the enactment of 
the Ridge Act, a total prohibition on construction automatically be-
came effective.l99 
Secondly, the Ridge Act offers local governments the opportunity 
to expand coverage to areas not expressly covered under the state 
statute.2OO Under the Act, a county can eliminate the 3000-foot eleva-
tion requirement, and expand coverage to all ridges with elevations 
at least 500 feet above the adjacent valley floor.201 
Finally, a county or city covered by the Ridge Act could choose to 
exempt itself from coverage of the Act by a binding referendum to be 
voted on before a date specified in the Act.202 Any county that had 
removed itself from the Act's coverage could opt to reverse this 
decision, again by a binding referendum vote.203 Only one county in 
North Carolina chose to hold a referendum vote to opt out of the 
Act.2M The referendum was voted down, however, and the county 
remains under the Ridge Act's prohibitions on construction.206 
194 [d. §§ 113A-208, -214. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See Heath, supra note 191, at 188. 
198 See id. 
199 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-208(a), -209(a) (1983). 
200 [d. §§ 113A-206(6), -208(d). 
201 [d. § 113A-206(6). 
202 [d. § 113A-214(a). 
200 Id. § 113A-214(b). 
204 See Heath, supra note 192, at 189. 
205 See id. 
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For counties that adopted the Act, construction within 100 feet of 
their mountain ridges is limited to buildings that are three stories 
high.206 For buildings that are already standing (and would violate the 
Act), repairs can be made, but no new construction, addition, or modi-
fication is allowed if it would put the structure in violation of the 
Act.207 
The Ridge Act recognizes that land use planning and zoning have 
traditionally been dealt with at the localleve1.208 However, it provides 
excellent guidance for local governments' implementation of the 
Act.209 
The Ridge Act also provides comprehensive enforcement options.21o 
The Act contains broad statutory citizen suit provisions, and author-
izes not only injured parties, but any citizen residing in a county 
where a violation occurs, to bring a civil action against an alleged 
violator.211 According to the Act, an action for an alleged violation may 
seek injunctive relief, an enforcement order, and damages.212 The vio-
lator is also subject to criminal sanctions under the Act.213 Finally, 
counties that come under the Act's construction prohibition cannot 
authorize construction of a violating structure, or authorize utility 
service to the structure.214 
A. Potential Legal Challenges 
Because the Ridge Act restricts the use of real property, it is a 
certain target for legal challenges-most likely regulatory takings, 
due process, or equal protection claims.216 However, in the fourteen 
years since the Ridge Act was passed, there has not been a single 
reported decision of a legal challenge to the Act. Perhaps this is 
206 See id. at 190. 
2M N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-210(l) and (2). 
208 See Kessler, supra note 5, at 200. 
209 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-205 to -214 (1983). 
210 See id. § 113A-211. 
211 [d. 
212 [d. 
218 [d. 
214 See Heath, supra note 192, at 194. 
[d. 
The reach of these prohibitions is worth emphasizing. For example, a county health 
department sanitarian cannot grant a septic tank permit to a building that violates the 
Act; the sanitarian who does so could be prosecuted for violating the Act, ordered to 
deny the permit, or be held liable for damages or other civil relief in a citizen suit. 
216 See Kessler, supra note 5, at 205-20. 
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because of the way the Act was designed, but most likely the lack of 
litigation stems from the fact that although the Act restricts the 
height of buildings constructed above a certain elevation, it does not 
prohibit construction entirely.216 A total ban on development, while 
better suited to further the aesthetic purposes of ridge line zoning, 
would almost certainly give rise to takings challenges.217 
V. A SAMPLING OF METHODS TO PROTECT RIDGE LINES 
While ridge line zoning appears to be the most direct method for 
the legislative preservation of scenic ridge lines, mountain towns 
across the United States have utilized a number of innovative ap-
proaches to preserve the scenic beauty of their surroundings.218 The 
following are a few examples: 
• Teton County, Wyoming, is home to one of the most famous scenic 
mountain ranges in the United States, the Teton Range, and to Jack-
son Hole, the ski resort with the biggest vertical drop (4,100 feet) of 
any in the country.219 The town of Jackson is situated in a high eleva-
tion valley, 50 miles long, and at its widest point, ten miles wide.220 In 
recent years, Jackson has become extremely popular, especially with 
wealthy visitors whose "trophy" homes of 10,000 and 20,000 square 
feet have begun to change the character and pristine beauty that 
visitors come to Jackson to enjoy.221 
Concerned by the rapid growth and changing character of their 
town, Jackson residents held a public workshop on land use planning 
in 1990.222 By 1995, Teton County and the town of Jackson adopted 
radical new land use regulations.223 The regulations reflected the resi-
216 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-211 (1983). 
217 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
218 See generally HoWE, supra note 1, at 47-139. 
219 See id. at 54. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. In the 1970s alone, the population of Teton County doubled. [d. 
222 See HOWE, 8Upra note 1, at 56. 
228 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See HOWE, supra note 1, at 56. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. at 57. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See HoWE, 8Upra note 1, at 76. 
233 See id. at 76-7. 
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dents' desire to preserve a small town flavor, and the area's natural 
beauty, unique wildlife, and pristine views of the Teton Range.224 
The new land use plans combine local regulations with financial 
incentives for developers and home owners.225 For example, before the 
1995 regulations, rural zoning in Teton County required only three to 
six acre lots.226 The county's new zoning code requires that lots in rural 
zoned areas be no smaller than 35 acres.227 However, if the owner of 
a rural lot agrees to set aside a large portion of the property as 
permanent open space, the county will allow three to six homes to be 
cluster-developed on the 35 acres.228 
The county has also designated scenic areas in which developers 
must meet building standards designed to preserve views of the 
mountains.229 These building standards regulate the location, size and 
height of structures.230 Finally, the county has limited the size of new 
homes to 8,000 square feet in order to reduce the impact of "eyesores 
on the ridge lines."231 
• In the Rocky Mountain ski towns of Vail and Crested Butte, 
Colorado, residents have approved a real estate transfer tax to be 
used for the purchase of open-space.232 In Vail, the tax generates 
approximately $2 million a year for open space acquisition.233 In 1997, 
the town of Vail owned and managed nearly 1,000 acres of preserved 
open space.234 
• Conservation easements are an effective legal tool for preserving 
open space, and protecting ridge lines on privately owned property.235 
A conservation easement allows a landowner to gain financial benefit 
from property without selling or subdividing it.236 Because a property 
interest is really a bundle of legal rights, a landowner can separate 
some rights from the bundle and transfer them to another owner-for 
example, the right to mine under their land.237 
A conservation easement is the sale or donation of the property's 
development rights, often to a municipality or a land bank like The 
Nature Conservancy.238 The easement runs with the land and perma-
nently extinguishes the possibilty that the land will be developed.239 
Conservation easements offer significant tax benefits to land-
owners.240 A property owner who donates an easement or sells it 
234 See id. at 77. 
235 See id. at 79. 
236 See id. 
237 See HoWE, supra note 1, at 79. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. 
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below market value can receive income tax deductions for the value 
of the charitable donation.241 The property owner can also benefit from 
lower estate and property taxes because the land no longer includes 
development rights.242 
CONCLUSION 
It is well established that state and municipal governments have 
the right to zone for purely aesthetic purposes. Ridge line zoning 
furthers legitimate government interests, and courts have held that 
the protection of mountain views furthers the general welfare. How-
ever, while government has the right to regulate land use to preserve 
mountains and scenic vistas, individuals may still challenge the regu-
lation. Most often these challenges will include regulatory takings 
claims, and the Lucas decision gives the landowner strong judicial 
support.243 After Lucas, it is possible that a court would find that the 
government must compensate the landowner even if the property 
value has been only partially diminished. 
Because of the current judicial climate for takings reviews, states 
and municipalities should be careful to draft ridge line zoning ordi-
nances precisely but flexibly. Provisions like those found in the North 
Carolina Mountain Ridge Protection Act, which allow citizens to vote 
by referendum regarding the adoption of the ridge line zoning ordi-
nance in their community, are more likely to be upheld based on the 
fact that landowners had a direct opportunity to control the legisla-
tion's enactment. If drafted and enforced effectively, ridge line zoning 
ordinances could serve to protect the beauty of mountainous regions, 
and to preserve their spectacular views for present and future gen-
erations to enjoy. 
241 See id. 
242 See HoWE, supra note 1, at 79. 
243 See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
